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This EUSA Review Forum examines an increasingly
important aspect of the EU’s global role: its pursuit of a common
foreign, security, and (potentially) defense policy. Although the
EU has made great strides in foreign policy cooperation over the
past few decades, especially when compared to similar efforts in
other regional organizations, it still faces a number of challenges
in attempting to enhance its foreign policy capabilities in light
of the current debate on the EU’s constitutional structure. The
following essays by four EUSA members provide various
perspectives on some of these challenges, focusing on the complex
interplay between policy outcomes, institutional arrangements,
and the EU’s growing ambitions in security/defense affairs.
European Security and Defense Policy: The State of Play
Roy H. Ginsberg
HOW CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) work better abroad, and why
ask now? Although European foreign policy has considerable
political impact on many international actors and issues, the
world’s richest group of democracies does not have the influence
in international security that it does in international economics.
It under-funds the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and its offspring, the European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP). The jewel in the crown of ESDP will be the Rapid
Reaction Force (RRF) to conduct such tasks as peacekeeping
and conflict prevention when NATO does not wish to be involved.
Yet the gap between goals and capabilities is, well, legion. This
cause of alarm is exacerbated by two new, related external
developments. Counterterrorism requires an international
response to a primarily transnational phenomenon. President
Bush’s foreign policy, which stresses military dominance in a
unipolar world of ubiquitous security threats, challenges practices
of U.S.-EU foreign policy cooperation established by the first
Bush and Clinton Administrations.
The Constitutional Convention is considering proposals to
make the EU more efficient and democratic at home ahead of
enlargement. The better the EU works at home, the better it works
abroad. The more operational ESDP is, the more it fastens the
missing link of CFSP. The sooner the EU begins to reduce some
of the transatlantic military capabilities gaps, the more likely
what the EU does in international security will matter and create
conditions for more balance with the U.S. The more the EU
responds to changes in international security, the more it will
influence U.S. security policy. The EU needs political will and
resources to make ESDP work to its, and NATO’s, advantage.
ESDP is not new. The Europeans asked in the 1950s and
again in the 1990s how they could best enhance their own and
international security without American dominance. Efforts to
forge foreign policy cooperation in the 1970s led to passage of
the Maastricht Treaty, which established CFSP in 1993.
Whereas the “F” in CFSP continued to develop as overall
EU influence in international politics grew, the “S” in CFSP
weakened—nay, punished—European foreign policy during the
wars of national dissolution in Yugoslavia. There, in a “baptism
by fire,” the EU got burned for employing civilian diplomacy to
proffer peace in a zone of war while American air power brought
the Bosnian and Kosovo wars to an end (Ginsberg, 2001). This
sense of European powerlessness, which compared unfavorably
with American capabilities, and the specter of American pre-
emptiveness, set off developments that launched ESDP. The
Amsterdam Treaty gave the CFSP a High Representative and
codified the Petersburg Tasks (peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks,
conflict prevention, peace enforcement). The United Kingdom
supported an EU capacity for independent security action linked
with NATO at St. Malo. Between 1999 and 2001, the EU
established ESDP and announced the goals by 2003 to deploy
the RRF and a police force of 5,000 officers for crisis management
operations to perform Petersburg Tasks.
The EU exerts considerable influence in international affairs
even in the absence of a fully formed CFSP/ESDP. The external
relations acquis provides the base and frame for further
refinement and growth in European foreign policy . The EU has
considerable political impact on U.S. foreign policy/security
interests. For example, U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation
is stunning—witness the deployment of officials of the FBI in
Brussels and of Europol in Washington; the EU definition of
terrorism and freezing of terrorist assets; the EU-wide arrest
warrant; and U.S.-EU negotiations to expand cooperation on
extradition, prosecution of criminal/terrorist suspects, money
laundering, and intelligence sharing.
Enlargement is already reshaping polities, economies, and
societies of applicant states while exerting enormous influence
over vital interests of nonmembers in the wider neighborhood.
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end the Kosovo war when he did. EU participation in the “Mid-
East Quartet” underlines its importance in reaching and
implementing a final settlement. The EU is critical to postwar
reconstruction in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Dialogues with states
Washington considers rogue give the EU access to capitals where
there is little U.S. influence. The EU is forging new links in East
Asia and the Western Hemisphere to open trade and support
democracy. Participation in and funding for multilateral
institutions and nongovernmental organizations allow the EU to
shape the outcome of international negotiations.
Although the EU matters in international politics, there are
numerous instances when it could have acted but did not (Iraq),
and thus lost opportunity for influence. National foreign policy
preferences cannot always be melded into one. There are limits
to civilian diplomacy. Still, most Europeans generally express
support for ESDP to influence U.S. foreign policy and NATO,
curtail preemptory American leadership, and/or take
responsibility for international peace and security. With
uncharacteristic speed the EU has now set up a new institutional
structure for CFSP/ESDP.
The Political and Security Committee (PSC)—members’
ambassadors and the Commission—exercises political control
and strategic direction for EU military responses to a crisis. The
Crisis Situation Center provides the PSC with intelligence in
crisis management. The Policy Planning Unit identifies potential
crisis situations. The EU Military Committee (Chiefs of Defense)
is the forum for military cooperation in conflict prevention/crisis
management. It gives military advice to the PSC and provides
military direction to the EU Military Staff. The Military Staff,
which provides expertise and advice to the Military Committee
and PSC on defense issues, is responsible for early warning,
situation assessment, strategic planning for Petersburg Tasks,
and implementation of policies determined by the Military
Committee. The Joint Situation Center analyzes and makes use
of intelligence. The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management provides support for nonmilitary responses to crisis
management and the Police Unit plans/conducts police operations.
Since the EU depends on NATO to implement many
Petersburg Tasks, EU-NATO cooperation is critical. The two
held their first ministerial in Budapest in 2001. The cease-fire
between rebel forces and the Macedonian government in summer
2001 was brokered and enforced by the EU and NATO. EU and
NATO Foreign Ministers met in December 2001 to affirm joint
cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The long-delayed EU-
NATO accord on EU use of NATO assets when NATO does not
wish to be involved is expected to be finalized soon, which could
pave the way for deployment of an EU conflict prevention force
to Macedonia to replace the NATO force.
In 2002, the EU incorporated the WEU into its remit, funded
its satellite navigation project, held its first crisis management
exercise, and held its first meeting of Defense Ministers. The
Commission established the Rapid Reaction Mechanism,
enabling it to respond expeditiously to international crises. France
and Britain announced increases in defense spending. Germany
and Sweden began to restructure armed forces for peacekeeping.
The commitment of several members to order the Airbus A400M
transport carrier is a barometer of support for ESDP, although
the green light to begin production hinges on the size of the
German order. The EU declared some aspects of ESDP partly
operational in December 2001. It has a sufficient commitment
of troops to staff the future RRF and civilian police missions.
The first litmus test for EU crisis management comes in 2003
with deployment of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia
to help establish the rule of law, promote stability, and deny
terrorist organizations the opportunity to take root.
Germany’s role in ESDP is growing by virtue of its
willingness to deploy out of area. Its soldiers have been deployed
to the Balkans. The Germans and Dutch will assume command
over the international security force in Kabul in 2003. The more
Germany is at home abroad, the more ESDP benefits from an
increased political will and capability.
ESDP will have to evolve well beyond the year ahead to
activate the RRF. It took three decades to develop monetary union
from vision to reality. National defense industries remain
protected, subsidized, and unable to enjoy economies of scale
and profitability. More standardization, cross-border mergers,
role specialization, and EU-wide defense procurement would
reduce duplication and yield cost savings to fund ESDP
capabilities. Given sluggish economic growth, cost savings need
to come from non-defense areas and from changes within defense
spending categories. Additional funding could result from a more
flexible interpretation of Stability Pact spending limits. The paltry
annual CFSP budget is lamentable. Members still do not agree
on the formula for financing ESDP operations.
The EU has identified shortfalls in capabilities: command
and control, air and sea lift, intelligence, precision guided
airplanes, electronic warfare, logistics, combat support units,
precision guided munitions, communications equipment and
headquarters, suppression of enemy air defense, and combat
search and rescue. The RAND Corporation predicts that the EU
members will need to spend $24 to $56 billion to meet capabilities
shortfalls and suggests ESDP will not be fully operational until
2007.
The world will not wait for the EU to respond to changes in
international security. The EU has often been catalyzed by outside
events to shape new policy initiatives. The EU should make the
EUPM a success and Germany should fund the Airbus A400M.
Members should make faster progress in reorganizing European
defense and procurement markets and increase spending on R&D
in defense technologies. Here the United States can help by easing
up on certain export controls.
The need for the EU to back diplomacy with lower-end
security tasks, the specter of continued terrorism, and the prospect
of EU marginalization in U.S. foreign policy deliberations
together ought to weigh heavily on the EU leadership.
Recommitment to ESDP at the highest political levels (a St. Malo
II, including Berlin) can break the logjam of resistance to reforms
necessary to make ESDP operational. The Cassandras who speak
of transatlantic drift because of the U.S.-EU military imbalances
ought to note the results of the recent poll of Americans and
Europeans conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations and the German Marshall Fund. Respondents wantEUSA Review    Winter 2003
good transatlantic relations as well as bilateral and multilateral
cooperation to help solve global problems like terrorism.
Roy Ginsberg is professor of government at Skidmore College.
Institutional Moments, Policy Performance, and the
Future of EU Security/Defense Policy
Michael E. Smith
THE EU’S AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT of a global political role over the
past several decades is a unique ambition for a regional economic
organization. A combination of exogenous and endogenous
factors has further encouraged the institutionalization of these
efforts at the EU level (Smith, forthcoming). Enlargements in
particular can serve as key “institutional moments” during which
EU member states reconsider the ends and means of their
cooperation. As the EU faces yet another such moment, combined
with its first-ever Constitutional Convention, it may be helpful
to revisit some general lessons about how the EU adapts to
pressures for institutional change for insights into the prospects
for reforms in this domain.
Since the creation of European Political Cooperation in the
1970s, change in this policy domain can be understood in terms
of a sequential process of institutional development involving
intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational
elements guided by several more general principles. First,
exogenous forces, such as enlargements, typically provide only
a window of opportunity for debate over institutional change;
they do not determine the specific outcome. Second, endogenous
processes within EU foreign policy structures (chiefly learning-
by-doing and imitation) generally provide the range of possible
options. Third, reforms tend to reflect a balance between
pragmatic operational concerns and enduring ideological/legal
debates within the EU. As a result, specific choices codified by
EU member states are almost always incremental and progressive
rather than revolutionary. In other words, the EU’s pursuit of a
coherent, high-profile external relations capability is predicated
on the respect of both the functional track record of foreign policy
rules and the legitimacy those rules have earned based on that
track record.
At present, the EU is again attempting to strike a workable
balance between institutional stability (to promote a coherent
global identity) and flexibility (to allow a variety of responses
and participants). At the same time, however, it is attempting to
develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that
provides for the application of deadly force. The question here is
whether this approach will suffice in light of the EU’s ambitions
as a global military actor and the high political and economic
costs surrounding enlargement. In my view, although the EU has
reached a high level of civilian and economic foreign policy
cooperation (Ginsberg, 2001), there are reasons to be concerned
about the pursuit of an ESDP based on the EU’s performance
since the Nice Treaty. Leaving aside the issues of involving non-
EU states (like Turkey) in EU foreign policy and harmonizing
the ESDP with NATO, Nice and its immediate aftermath did
little to enhance ESDP capabilities beyond a slight clarification
and expansion of existing procedures. In line with the principles
noted above, Nice in particular failed to extend the notion of
“enhanced cooperation” to the ESDP. This is a crippling
limitation; if there is any area of the CFSP that might require a
“coalition of willing” to take charge, it is in the area of military/
defense issues. Given the limited reforms under Nice, the EU
will have to resort, as usual, to selective learning-by-doing (and
thus institution-building) in the ESDP domain. However, we
cannot fully assess this possibility until several EU states actually
attempt an independent military operation. Two recent examples
demonstrate the practical limits of achieving a consensus on such
an operation.
In Macedonia, the EU revealed a division between those
willing to lead (France and the UK), others preferring to hold
back or let NATO lead (Germany) and the smaller and/or neutral
EU states concerned about being left out or dominated by the
larger ones. France, with some support from Germany, proposed
a 1,500-person multinational peace force for Macedonia to
remain beyond NATO’s self-imposed 30-day limit. Instead, EU
foreign ministers backed a NATO-led follow-on force to protect
up to 200 monitors after the main force left. At this point, French
foreign minister Hubert Vedrine admitted that the EU was still
not yet ready to lead its own force. Thus, due to the opposition of
one or more member states, the EU seems to have failed at least
four times (Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia) to play an
independent military role in the Balkans. This does not suggest a
potential for true operational independence from NATO even in
an area of strategic significance for the EU. Even when EU states
deploy troops, they are hobbled by concerns about mission creep,
public opposition to the use of military force, and open-ended
troop commitments. These issues will further constrain the
operational capability of the ESDP.
The September 11 terrorist attacks revealed a similar
dynamic. Here the EU was extremely quick to speak with a
common voice in its initial response to the attacks. However, as
Howorth recently reported (2002), EU states expressed support
for the U.S. and offered troops to the effort, but on a bilateral
and national basis rather than collectively on behalf of the EU.
Equally problematic for the ESDP, the bulk of operational support
for the U.S. was provided by the UK, which further reinforced
perceptions of an unfair or inappropriate special relationship
between these countries. Even more embarrassing for the EU, in
December 2001 the Belgian EU presidency prematurely
announced at the Laeken summit that the ESDP was “opera-
tional” and that the EU would provide up to 4,000 troops for the
peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. This could have been the
first deployment of the EU’s new Rapid Reaction Force, yet
France, Germany, and the UK (among others) quickly denied
the announcement and insisted that they would deploy troops on
their own accord, not under the institutional umbrella of the EU.
These missed opportunities show that exogenous problems alone
do not prompt significant institutional changes in the EU (at least
in terms of CFSP/ESDP). Moreover, it still seems all too easy
for other actors (whether allies or enemies) to divide the EU on
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to common European interests are absent. The current situation
with Iraq, like Afghanistan and Macedonia, also clearly exhibits
these dynamics.
These episodes, and past experience in EPC/CFSP, also
suggest that the EU may have reached the limits of a consensus-
driven approach to CFSP in light of the pending stresses of
enlargement. EU states will have to delegate more responsibilities
to the Commission and/or allow a Council of Defense Ministers
to govern this domain, while also possibly instituting compliance
mechanisms. EU states still seem unable to agree on a funda-
mental justification for the ESDP: as a support arm for NATO
(UK), as an independent EU force (France), or solely as a peace-
keeping/humanitarian force (Germany and Sweden). Even with
these changes, the ESDP is likely to be operational only in situa-
tions where NATO (i.e., the U.S.) clearly refuses to participate.
NATO is still better organized and equipped for operational
action, and shows far more dynamism in terms of mission
expansion, enlargement, and cooperating with key non-EU states
(Turkey, Russia). How the ESDP will develop while upholding
equally important principles of subsidiarity, transparency, and
democracy also remains to be seen. And unless the ESDP
provides for a more robust decision-making mechanism (even
through “enhanced cooperation” or “differentiated integration”)
with more resources, it is highly doubtful it could be used to
compel other actors to change their behavior in line with EU
policies. There is a huge conceptual and operational gap between
well-developed “normal” CFSP activities and military-related
actions, and it may be that only a major external crisis and/or a
major change of U.S. policy (such as withdrawing from NATO)
would lead the EU to transform its weak ESDP plans into a truly
effective independent military force. In short, limited institutional
reforms, tight defense budgets, and uncertain political will,
coupled with the challenge of enlargement and the presence of
NATO as an alternative, suggest that ESDP may be little more
than a psychological insurance policy to back up NATO.
However, recent experience, particularly in Macedonia,
suggests a potential, though still evolving, division of labor
between the EU and NATO: NATO threatens military force while
the EU simultaneously offers economic rewards. This could be
the future model, assuming both institutions agree on the political
priorities in such cases (i.e., to deter, compel, or punish; to support
fragmentation or unification; etc.) and on the same balance
between carrots and sticks. If ultimately successful, Macedonia
might also demonstrate how an early, smaller deployment could
prevent long, open-ended missions as in Kosovo and Bosnia.
Still, unless major institutional reforms can overcome the
problems noted above, the ESDP will remain a passive symbol
of collective identity rather than an active behavioral expression
of it. The history of institutional change in this domain, however,
suggests that the former, rather than the latter, is the most likely
outcome.
Michael E. Smith is assistant professor of political science
at Georgia State University.
Giving Peace a Chance: What the EU Can Teach
the U.S.
Hazel Smith
IN THIS ESSAY, I REVIEW how the European Union deals with “anti-
systemic” states and groups, focusing on the examples of Central
America in the 1980s and the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, in the
1990s and 2000s. I argue that although the EU shared common
objectives with the United States, it adopted policy instruments
at variance with those used by the U.S. and, as a result, was
more successful than that of the U.S. in achieving foreign policy
goals. I further argue that the United States should learn from
the European Union in devising and implementing policies
designed to cope with the proliferation of anti-systemic
movements in the twenty-first century.
EU philosophy, policy and instruments towards
anti-systemic states and movements
In this essay, anti-systemic states and movements are
understood as being underpinned by radical anti-liberal ideologies
—whether these be motivated by religious, nationalist or political
rationales. The Union’s approach towards anti-systemic states
and movements was shaped by the historical, political and
geographical interrelationship with the Communist states of East
Europe and the former Soviet Union that was constitutive of its
political and institutional ontology. During the Cold War, the
Community and the member states learned the art of peaceful
coexistence as well as judicious engagement while, at the same
time, avoiding military conflict that could spill over into its
territory. The Community also learned that its coordination with
the United States was essential but that did not mean that there
would never be distinct “European” interests and sometimes
conflict with its most important partner as to what should be the
appropriate instruments of foreign policy. Its resistance, for
instance, to the imposition of sanctions on the USSR in 1979 and
Poland in 1981 caused both irritation and anger in the United
States.
A distinct European modus operandi was further molded
by its global policies towards discrete conflicts and particular
anti-systemic states and social movements—starting with the first
extra-European activity in the 1960s and 1970s as the Community
developed a policy towards the Middle East, including the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Community’s
shared objectives with its major partner, the United States, were
to promote peace and stability in the region. Where it differed
was in its willingness to recognize the PLO as a legitimate partner
in the process of peace-making, its reliance on economic
instruments including the promotion of trade agreements and
associations and the allocation of aid, its emphasis on the
promotion of political dialogue with all actors and its rejection
of the use of military and security instruments as a method of
“peace-building.” This was not just a case of making a virtue out
of necessity of the Community’s civilian character attributes.
After all, France and the United Kingdom (after its accession in
1973) had capable military forces—as demonstrated in military
interventions in the Sinai in 1981 and in the Balkans in the 1990s,EUSA Review    Winter 2003
when both nations used their military forces in support of policies
closely coordinated with the Community/Union.
Mitigating revolution in Central America
The Community finessed its philosophy and instruments in
the Central American conflicts of the 1980s as it developed a
comprehensive strategy towards the armed revolutionary
movement, the FMLN, in El Salvador, and the revolutionary
government of Sandinista Nicaragua (1979-1990). The
Community offered positive inducements in return for
demonstrable commitments to building institutions embedded in
liberal democratic norms. Inducements included aid, diplomatic
recognition, support for intra and inter-regional cooperation and
a willingness to act as a diplomatic interlocutor with the United
States government. By contrast, the United States relied almost
wholly on a strategy of militarization of the conflicts—becoming
the most substantial financier and trainer of counter-revolutionary
governmental forces in El Salvador and the contra mercenaries
that brought destruction to Nicaraguan border regions, resulting
in the killing and maiming of Sandinista soldiers and Nicaraguan
civilians. Neither the Salvadorean FMLN nor the Sandinista
military were defeated by military forces and yet both El Salvador
and Nicaragua achieved transitions to democracy through
political negotiation and electoral processes. This outcome owed
much to international efforts, including the EU’s active diplomacy,
that both encouraged peaceful solutions and delegitimized the
military options favored by the United States.
Dealing with the DPRK
More recently, the European Union has demonstrated a
renewed commitment to its tried and tested approach to anti-
systemic states. In the wake of the North-South Korea summit
of June 2000, EU member states and the EU, at the behest of
South Korean president and now Nobel Peace prize-winner Kim
Dae Jung, engaged in a round of diplomacy that ended with
diplomatic recognition of the DPRK by 13 of the 15 member
states and the Union itself. Diplomatic recognition was
accompanied by tough dialogue on security and human rights
along with aid designed specifically to support a transition to a
market economy. DPRK officials received training on human
rights in Sweden and the UK, the principles and practices of
market economies, as well as in less politically sensitive areas
such as agriculture and English language studies. Moves towards
imposing restrictions on technical assistance after the revelations
of late 2002 that the DPRK has acquired uranium enrichment
technology, a prerequisite for a nuclear arms program,
demonstrate the use of another civilian instrument, that of aid
withdrawal, as part of the armory of EU instruments.
The common objectives of U.S. and Union policy towards
the DPRK are the promotion of stability and the transition to the
market economy and democracy. The belligerent policies of the
Bush administration have noticeably failed to achieve progress
towards any of these goals. The refusal to continue the
negotiations on the security/missile deal that took Madeleine
Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000 and the subsequent
inability to craft a policy other than at the level of rhetoric have
left the administration in policy paralysis. By contrast, the EU is
engaged in active diplomacy and, given the market reforms of
September 2002, may be contributing to the slow transformation
towards marketization in the DPRK. The European Union,
however, unlike the United States, has only indirect interests in
security issues on the Korean peninsula and it is the latter which
must craft a policy to resolve security tensions. The United States
could usefully learn from the Union and develop a comprehensive
policy that combines vigorous diplomacy with carefully employed
inducements, close monitoring of agreements and the
encouragement of intra-regional cooperation as a means of
integrating this most anti-systemic of anti-systemic states into
the international system.
Learning from the European Union
The Union cannot achieve foreign policy success in all arenas
with its supercession by U.S. diplomacy in the Balkans in the
mid-1990s still a powerful reminder that the United States can
sometimes achieve results when the Union cannot. Lack of EU
capacity in one conflict, however, should not mask the enormous
achievements in other areas, not the least being the transformation
of East and Central Europe towards democracy, largely assisted
by an intensive Union involvement designed to support common
Western goals of peace, stability and economic renewal in the
wider Europe.
The philosophy and methods developed by the EU are more
than ever relevant today given the variety of difficult relations
with anti-systemic states and groups that major powers must
manage in order to achieve global stability. The most immediate
challenge to both the United States and the European Union is to
build a strategy that can convince the poor and disenfranchised
of the Muslim world that Western capitalism has more to offer
than fundamentalist Islam. This policy cannot be based on
belligerent rhetoric, disrespect (perceived or actual) of Islam, or
inattention to the extraordinary economic and political deprivation
and extreme inequality facing these populations.
A strategy based on a tough but nuanced and mutually
respectful dialogue may initially appear unappealing because of
its implicit understanding that compromise may be needed on all
sides. Provided compromise is not on matters of principle,
however, this is what successful diplomacy is all about. The
United States is the most powerful military power on earth yet
preponderant military power, as the U.S. knows from its
experiences in Korea and Vietnam, does not always translate
into the ability to control outcomes. The United States should
learn lessons from European Union success in dealing with anti-
systemic states and movements and apply these lessons in its
approaches to dealing with countries whose objectives it does
not share. This way the United States, might achieve the foreign
policy goals it has set itself. Like the European Union, the United
States should “give peace a chance.”
Hazel Smith is reader in international relations at the
University of Warwick.Winter  2003   EUSA Review
An Effective and Legitimate CFSP: Challenges Faced
by the Constitutional Convention and the Next IGC
Walter Carlsnaes
ALTHOUGH THE CONVENTION ON THE Future of Europe established
at the Laeken Summit in 2001 was initially set up in response to
a general unease with the functioning of the EU, especially in
anticipation of enlargement and the decision-making problems
that would inevitably follow in its wake, it has also come to
embrace foreign policy issues and attempts at reforming Pillar II
structures. The latter has come as something of a surprise, since
CFSP/ESDP issues were scarcely mentioned either in the Treaty
of Nice or in the Laeken Declaration. In any event, as recently
noted by Christopher Hill, the question whether reform of the
CFSP is necessary or not has been quickly answered in the
affirmative by the Convention, with the result that already at
this point in its deliberations, “some quite serious measures are
on the table” (Hill, 2002: 25).
However, the Convention is not simply faced with the task
of coming to grips with problems of size and effective decision-
making procedures within the context of enlargement, but was
also given a broad mandate to show the way toward “a clear,
open, effective, democratically controlled Community approach.”
In short, underlying its creation lies not only a concern with the
future problem-solving effectiveness of EU institutions, even
though these are clearly of an overriding nature. Of equal
importance, Fritz Scharpf recently argued in a talk given in
Stockholm, is the normative appropriateness of EU institutions
and processes, especially in the light of the increased demand
within Europe for a greater clarity of competencies, a greater
transparency of decision processes, and a greater democratic
accountability of decision-makers (Scharpf, 2002: 2). The
question is how the Convention will be able to contribute to both
aims without compromising either. In the past successful
institutional reforms – such as those adopted in the Single
European Act or at Maastricht – were focused almost exclusively
on substantive policy issues or on goals on which prior agreement
had been reached, whereas present concerns seem less
preoccupied with questions of policy effectiveness and more with
criteria pertaining to institutional appropriateness and democratic
legitimacy.
Although the tension between these two aims affects the
future of the EU as a whole, particularly in view of the challenge
posed by the upcoming integration of the new accession states,
it also complicates the ambition of making the CFSP more
effective. This increased concern with foreign policy and security
issues was already evident prior to the events of 11 September
2001 (particularly in connection with the launch of the ESDP in
1998), and has become even more pronounced subsequently as
the U.S. has expanded—mainly in a unilateralist and militarist
mode—its all-out campaign against international terrorism and
Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, here I will confine myself
to a single aspect, albeit a central one if the ambition of the
Convention of reforming the intergovernmental Pillar II structures
will have any chance of success: the issue of how foreign policy
should be made in future.
At present, as Scharpf has argued, EU policy-making is
conducted in terms of three different modes of governance
differing substantially with respect to the criteria of effectiveness
and legitimacy. The first and most fundamental is that of
intergovernmental negotiation, based essentially on the principle
of unanimity. Its polar opposite is supranational centralization,
requiring—as, e.g., with the European Central Bank—no
agreement whatsoever on the part of national governments.
However, the most frequently employed mode is what Scharpf
has called joint-decision making, in Brussels often referred to
as “the Community method.” It has a number of procedural
variants (one of the tasks of the Convention is in fact to simplify
these), but the dominant mode is that policy proposals must
originate in the Commission, and in order to become effectuated,
they need to be approved by a qualified majority vote in the
Council of Ministers and by an absolute majority of the members
of the European Parliament.
All three modes differ on how they balance the dual
desiderata of effectiveness and legitimacy. Based on the power
(both positive and negative) of the veto, the first scores high on
legitimacy but considerably less on its problem-solving
effectiveness. The second, not dependent on national agreement
or preferences, is potentially very effective, but achieves
legitimacy only within the narrow boundaries of its specific
mandate, premised on earlier joint and essentially irrevocable
commitments. The third mode produces considerably better
effectiveness than intergovernmentalism, and—given its behold-
enness to support from both national governments and the
European Parliament—has a broader foundation underwriting
its legitimacy than the supranational model.
Why, given the availability of these three types of
governance, and especially the advantages of the joint-decision
mode, is there nevertheless a perceived need to reform the
institutional framework for making EU foreign policy decisions?
If these have worked in the past, why has the Convention come
to feel that reform is now necessary? The answer is clearly
anything but straightforward, but the following factors hint at
the dilemma involved.
Given the establishment and rapid development of the ESDP
as an integral part of the CFSP, including the Rapid Reaction
Force (RRF), intended to consist of national armed forces ready
for swift deployment to high-risk conflict areas, any decisions
made in its name will, of necessity, achieve high political salience
within member states. As a result it will be well nigh impossible
for their governments to be bound by majority decisions invol-
ving the sending of national contingents of RRF troops to combat
zones. As W. Wessels noted recently, “[O]nly national authorities
are legitimated to send out soldiers with the risk to be killed”
(Wessels, 2002: 5). At the same time it will be very difficult—
for all kinds of historical, ideological and other reasons—to attain
unanimity on European missions of this nature. Instead, any
attempts to do so will undoubtedly provoke both divisive national
debates and sticky negotiations on the European level, none of
which is conducive to constructive diplomatic behavior in crisis
situations or, if the need arises, the kind of fleet-footed capability
envisaged by the architects of RRF.EUSA Review    Winter 2003
In the light of this dilemma and the need for high levels of
consensus on foreign policy issues, essentially two options are
available within the Community framework. The first is to
downgrade the influence of member governments in favour of
upgrading the role of the Commission and the European
Parliament. However, as Scharpf has argued, proposals along
these lines are ”based on an inadequate understanding of the
normative preconditions of legitimate majority rule” (Scharpf,
2002: 11). There is in any case little reason to expect the
upcoming Intergovernmental Conference to move in this
direction, and any attempts by the Convention to propel European
institutions towards a more majoritarian system could very well
backfire by provoking current European debate and opinion to
go against such change.
The second option, advocated by Scharpf, is to accept the
legitimacy of divergent national interests and preferences, and
hence also the continued functionality of the current three modes
of governing within the Union. The crucial issue then becomes
how to cope with legitimate diversity in the pursuit of European
foreign and security policy. If the Union is not to become wholly
impotent in its foreign and security policy-making, this means
that its members have to be willing to compromise on the
requirement of uniformity.
The magic words here are “differentiated integration,”
opportunities for which already exist within the framework of
the Treaties. In theory, this means that it would be “possible for
some governments to pool their military resources and to integrate
their foreign policy even if such initiatives were not supported
by all members states … In short, differentiated integration could
facilitate European solutions in policy areas where unilateral
national solutions are no longer effective while uniform European
solutions could not be agreed upon” (Scharpf, 2002: 14).
However, this solution has one major drawback: while “in theory”
possible, this type of proposal is highly circumscribed by the
Amsterdam Treaty, and policies promulgated in its name cannot
challenge the existing body of European law. Also, it has never
been tried.
The underlying scepticism—even hostility—towards
differentiated integration emanates from a deep-rooted ideological
commitment to uniform law as a precondition for full integration.
Scharpf’s conclusion, and one which I find persuasive, is not
only that a distinction should be made in the ongoing
constitutional debate in Europe between legitimate and
illegitimate diversity, but also that the Convention and the
upcoming IGC should take upon themselves the task of trying to
override this negative frame of mind and, instead, to base their
deliberations on an acceptance of the reality of a multi-level
European polity. If this task is taken seriously, we can perhaps
also look forward to European foreign and security policy in due
course becoming both more effective and more legitimate.
Walter Carlsnaes is professor of government at Uppsala
University and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
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